Topic: Political Theory
Revolution For Dummies, Part Two A discussion of anti-government movement strategies and theories.by Billy Roper
(libertarian)
Thursday, January 28, 2010
COMBAT STRENGTH
Our conflict is not between two clear-cut groups of fixed composition and predetermined military strength. It would be a rare occurrence if either the belligerents or the opponents included the entire population or group of people whom they purport to represent, however both sides are dependent upon a variety of support from vast numbers of people from various factions of the society. The wider population, if sympathetic, may provide specialized assistance, funds, facilities, supplies, take less dangerous symbolic actions of support or provide fresh volunteers for more militant action. Correspondingly, the attitudes and activities of the masses affect the behavior and morale of the public officials, police and military that carry out the repression. A change in attitude could possibly lead to a change in government policy or even to a change in government. In the end, it will not be the professional revolutionaries who determine the outcome of the battle, it will be the respective population.
Another source of impact from outside the defined group may come from foreign aid. An influx of Arab petrol dollars, for instance, would go a long way in oiling the machinery of the movement, but all foreign financial assistance must come with a Surgeon General's warning slapped on the side that we must not allow our core values to be co-opted by a foreign body's political agenda. The expression of world opinion through public statements or pronouncements by international organizations, political intervention by world leaders, economic boycotts, embargoes, diplomatic representations or severance of diplomatic relations may be influential on occasion but are, however, most often ineffective.
If we wish to take stock of our total combat strength we need also, of course, to estimate the degree of participation of those who wage the actual struggle: the ones who refuse to work in a strike, the volunteers who disobey laws in a civil disobedience campaign, the people who refuse to pay taxes, who protest in the streets and who leave boycotted goods on the shelf. If their active involvement is strong, then the movement is strong. If their active involvement is weak, then the movement is weak. On the other side of the field, the opponent group's relative strength relies on active participants such as administrators, civil servants, soldiers, police, members of the penal system and others, who, though they may not be directly involved in the conflict at any given point in time, are nevertheless agents of the adversary that carry out their policies and countermeasures. When information is not passed up the chain of command, when orders are not relayed clearly to subordinates or when responsibilities are not executed efficiently on a widespread basis, then our opponent's relative power position has been significantly weakened. Unreal appearances of strength are never lasting. Membership organizations who would try to convince us they have 2000 members when their actual membership is closer to 200 are not being advantageous to anyone for any reason. On a similar note, efforts to pad membership numbers with individuals who are soft on ideological matters may, in fact, weaken the movement if they are sought at the expense of undermining the prerequisites of power. Furthermore, that unreal strength won't be available when called upon to act. It is the assessment of genuine strength that is the crucial element in determining the course of the struggle.
FEAR
Fear plays an important role in maintaining the oppressive regime; if there is a great fear amongst the subjects then, like a whipped dog, even minor sanctions will produce conformity. It is to be embedded in the minds of our folk that fear does not contribute to the cessation of cruelties, it contributes to their continuation. There should be no shock or dismay at repression-it is the result of our enemy's recognition that we are a serious threat to their regime. As our campaign continues we can anticipate our civil liberties will be even further reduced. There will be a point in time when it is necessary for us to violate law and reassert our rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. At such a moment the characteristics of boldness and persistence will become indispensable for the prolongation of the movement. Bravery should not be considered a moral virtue, but rather a practical requirement.
Promoting the idea of an underground resistance is the worst thing that ever happened to our movement. For starters, there is no underground resistance, but the most important single objection to this concept is not only is it rooted in fear, but it contributes to fear. It contributes to paranoia and finger-pointing and reinforces the belief that victory is unattainable. To deal openly and honestly is to operate from a position of strength. Only small, insignificant entities believe violence is their only alternative. Secrecy and conspiratorial behavior might seem like a reasonable approach under present circumstances; however the consequences of the courage involved in open action strikes especially hard at the heart of a system characterized by the instillation of terror and submissiveness in its subjects. Serious attempts to maintain secrecy allows the sensation of fear to spread-fear that plans will be discovered, fear that leaders will be captured, fear that the organization will be broken, fear that key members and masses of followers will be rounded up and imprisoned. The spirit of the resistance will be dampened and potential supporters deterred. Instead of demonstrating to our enemies and to our kinsmen that repression is powerless, fear permeates the movement. Degeneration and demoralization proliferates.
Arguments in favor of secrecy seem to assume that it is not too difficult to keep government agencies from finding out exactly what it is that is to be kept secret. While it may be possible to keep certain subjects secret for some time, it is likely that sooner or later the police will learn not only the general intentions but even the most microscopic details of the plan as well. Modern electronic devices will be used in addition to the time-honored traditional methods of opening the mail, wiretapping, informants, police spies and undercover agents. Moreover, their use will be seen as justified by the public at large. Openness as simply an assertion of moral principle has little relevance. We are not concerned with the moral righteousness of our manners, but with the psychological, social and political effect of our behavior. A movement that is overly security conscious will need to reduce the number of people who plan and execute the key policies, while overall numbers will be reduced by the alienation of partisan persons and sympathizers who naturally distrust secret political organizations, especially in what is perceived to be a liberal democratic form of government. In the struggle to obtain freedom we must behave like free men, and free men do not engage in secret, underground movements.
LEADERSHIP
From our leaders we demand a stricter standard. Their responsibilities include working out a strategy and tactics, negotiation, promoting discipline, maintaining morale, serving as a spokesman for those who are less articulate, recruiting participants for the campaign, preparing volunteers for action and training those volunteers for specific and immediate tasks, offering solutions and organizing the implementation of those solutions. These organizational skills include publicizing the facts and grievances of the case at hand or generating cause-consciousness, promoting sympathy for the group and its aims, informing the public of our intentions and our plan of action and mobilizing financial resources and manpower. When new sympathizers and supporters appear, it will be necessary to show them how to help the movement in specific ways and to incorporate them into other active groups. Leaders need to be able to make decisions under pressure, cultivate support and accumulate resources such as food, energy and medical supplies for cataclysmic conditions right down to office equipment such as fax machines and photo copiers for everyday use. A cautionary note is the accumulation of resources must not be allowed to become a goal unto itself.
An effective network of communication is needed between the various branches and levels of the organization. If police measures and government control of communications and transportation systems make such communication difficult or impossible, then the planners must determine in advance the points and issues on which opposition will be launched and exactly how this will be accomplished. A pyramid of leadership must be formed with two or three or more ranks. Successive stages of leadership to replace immediately arrested leaders must be provided in advance and participants prepared to act without leaders in times of severe repression.
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